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ABSTRACT
The publications on fracture of metals emphasize the importance of avoiding so far as possi-
ble all causes of local stress concentration, particularly in closely designed, lightweight, highly
stressed parts subject to repetitions of large fluctuations of load. In cases where the design consi-
derations make some stress concentration unavoidable, certain precautions can be taken. Among
these are :
(1) use materials known to have the minimum of sensitivity to notches, tough materials
that will resist brittle fracture
(2) design for a lower average stress
(3) avoid sharp corners and abrupt changes of cross section by providing fillets with as
large radius as possible ;
(4) finish the surface smoothly ; and
(5) protect the surface from damage during operation and maintenance. Several speci.
fic cases of aircraft and ship failure are described.
Four years ago an airliner left Chicago with 37 persons abroad. An hour later several per-
sons along the countryside approximately (1513 kilometers) southeast of Minneapolis were watching
a thunderstorm which was approaching from the northwest. As the storm moved closer, the wind
increased in intensity and considerable lightning and thunder were observed. At this time the
airliner was seen flying below the overcast. The airliner appeared to enter the roll cloud or the
leading edge of the thunderstorm, at which time it was lost from view. Seconds later parts of the
airplane were seen falling. All of the 37 occupants were killed, and the aircraft was destroyed.
A thorough investigation was made by the Civil Aeronautics Board and National Bureau of
Standards. The probable cause of the accident was determined to be the loss of the outer panel
of the left wing, which separated from the aircraft as a result of a fatigue crack in the left front outer
panel attachment fitting which had been induced by a faulty design of that fitting. The fatigue
crack was aggravated by severe turbulence encountered in the thunderstorm.
The outer wing front and rear spar flanges attach to the center wing front and rear lowers par
flanges by means of a dihedral wedge,, as illustrated in Figure 1. Originally, the spar flanges were
bolted directly together, but tests of the prototype airplane demonstrated the need for a grater
lateral stability. Therefore, the outer wing was rotated seven degrees upward by means of
incorporating the dihedral wedge in the attachment of the outer wing to the center section.
It will be noted in Figure 1 that the attachment ends of the lower spar flanges and dihedral
wedge have four steps or vertical increases in thickness. In each step the vertical increase in thick-
ness is approximately 0.5 centimeter, except for the fourth step inboard on the center-section spar
flange, where the vertical increase in the thickness is approximately 1.8 centimeters. The radius
of the fillet of these steps is about 0.3 centimeter. Evidence indicated that the outer wing
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had first separated from the center section in the fillet of the fourth step of the lower front center-
section spar flange.
The spar flanges, consisting of 75ST aluminium alloy, were tested by the -National Bureau of
Standards. They were found to be of the proper chemical composition, and the tensile strength,
yield strength, and elongation met the specifications for the material. However. micrographic
examination of the mating portions of the failed spar flanges revealed that several fatigue cracks
had developed. Examination of the flange fracture revealed that the separation had started from a
fatigue crack approximately 2.2 centimeters long and .21 centimeter deep. the remaining cross
section of the material at this point failing from tension.
The right wing of another plane of the same type which went through the same storm failed
as a result of fatigue cracks which developed in exactly the same location. Fortunately. the buck-
led wing was discovered by a mechanic while the plane was standing on the ground.
In the spar flanges that were examined there was an abrupt change of'cross section. a fillet of
small radius with transverse grinding or machining marks, sharp edges around the bolt holes. and
axial scratches .%ithin them. All these are features long recognized to he conducive to fatigue
failure.
Soon after the crash of the one plane and the discovery of a fractured wing fitting iii the other,
all aircraft of this type were grounded for inspection. Of the 19 airplanes, including the two
mentioned above, five had fatigue cracks in the lower fourth step-down fitting of the front spars.
Three of these aircraft had fatigue cracks on both wings, and two had fatigue cracks on one wing.
The immediate corrective steps taken were : f 11 the front center-section spar flange was
modified so as to include five steps or vertical increases in thickness to avoid any radical change in
cross section, (2) the radius in the fifth-step fillet was increased from 0.3 centimeter to 1.13 centime-
ters, (3) two bolts were added, (4) all parts were polished, and )5) the wing root fittings were given
frequent and thorough inspections for fatigue cracks.
After completion of 3,000 hours of flight, extensive structural changes were made to the
wings. These included replacing the 75ST alwninium spars with larger extrusions made out of
24ST aluminum and replacing the step splice with a scarf splice. (The lower strength 24ST
is less sensitive to notches and surface irregularities than the higher strength 75ST1.
Several years ago an oil tanker that was over 150 meters in length split close to amidships
while moored at her repair dock in Boston. The entire deck and strake on each side was parted
and a huge "V" opened up as the forward and aft sections separated. The bottom buckled and
fractured in several places, but did not completely separate until the ship was moved. The crack
went nearly straight across the vessel extending from the chock on the starboard side to slightly
forward of the chock on the port side.
The water temperature was 5°C and the air temperature l °C. The front of the ship pro-
jected into the stream for a distance of 54 meters beyond the clock. A wind of 40 kilometers per
hour with gusts up to 72 kilometers per hour, blowing against the starboard side of the front of the
ship and forcing the stern against the dock, was of'suflicient force to snap one of the mooring cables
a short time before the ship itself fractured. In addition, the vessel was subjected to an unknown
amount of stress by fully loaded water and oil tanks in both the forward and aft sections. This
was the third tanker of this type to fail by complete fracture amidships during a two year period.
All three fractures were of a brittle nature and took place when the temperatures were below 10°C.
The portion of'the vessel including what appeared to be the origin of failure was subjected
to a thorough metallurgical examination at the Watertown Arsenal. Visual examination showed
clearly that the fracture lines start from a crater on the top surface of the deck and proceed in both
directions from this point. The crater was probably caused by striking an arc without depositing
sufficient weld metal to fill the hole. There was no evidence of fatigue.
263
The chemical analyses of the metals were:
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Elongation 2" (5 cm)
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Cooled
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The yield strength of both plates as reccivcd Iiroiu the fractured ship was less than half the
tensile strength and, therefore, failed to comply with the American Bureau of Ships specifications.
In addition, the tensile strength of' the sheer strake was less then the 58,000-psi minimum speci-
tied. Both plates were generally rather low in strength, particularly yield strength. This low
strength appears to have been a contributing factor to the failure of the vessel. The ductility of
the steel was excellent and the fractured test specimens showed no evidence of embrittlement.
Charpy " V " notch impact specimens of the deck plate had an impact strength at 27°C of 13 foot
pounds as received and 28 foot pounds after normalizing at 843°C.. At -40-C the energy required
to fracture was nearly the same for as received and normalized specimens, 3 and 4 foot pounds
respectively. The as-received deck plate tested about 6 loot pounds at 5"C. The transition tem-
peratures of the steels were :
As Received Hot Rolled} Normalized 1 lu•. at 843°C.
Deck .13°C 23=C
Slrake 56°C 33°C
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The transition temperature of these steels as hot rolled is rather high ; therefore, the resis-
tance of the steel to brittle fracture was poor at low temperature. The improved toughness of the
normalized plate appears to be due to the grain refinement. Both the deck and strakc plates had
an A.S.T.M. grain size of 2-4 in the as-received condition. After normalizing at 843C the deck-
grain size had reduced to 5-7 and the strake grain size to 7-8.
The welds around the chock and in the area of the failure were examined carefully. The
microstructure of the steel was considerably influenced by the rapid cooling that occurs within
this zone. Although the hardness and microstructure would not influence the toughness to a
marked degree, the increase in grain size will, in all probability, further raised the temperature
at which brittle failure will occur in the ship plate. This factor is of considerable importance since
microscopic examination revealed that the metal directly under the crater at the origin of failure
was heat affected.
The problem of ship failure would seem to be more easily solved by using steels that are less
susceptible to brittle failure at low temperatures than by attempting to remove all notches and
similar structural stress raisers, although changes in design and care in fabrication and use to re-
duce these stress raisers to the very minimum will reduce the number of failures.
" The problem of acquiring an understanding of the exact cause of failure is very difficult
because of the many complex factors that exert an influence. Extensive studies have been made
and are continuing on such factors as stress distribution, strain rate, temperature, design, fatigue,
welding, internal stresses, decarburization, corrosion and corrosion fatigue, coatings, hydrogen
embrittlement, inculsions, and notches, both built-in and accidental.
The nucleus of a fracture is almost invariably located at some surface imperfection in the
form of a notch, scratch, damage mark, flaw, or sharp change in contour or section thickness.
Heavy parts of large sections which are subjected to light loads often have these stress raisers and
do not fail, in spite of them. Because of this, many designers are inclined to Forget the disastrous
consequences of these stress raisers in less massive and more heavily loaded structures.
These surface imperfections are a very serious matter in parts that are designed to reduce
weight to the very minimum.
The " factor of safety " has also been reduced. Nearly all aircraft parts fall into this cate-
gory. Airplane propellers have failed as a result of progressive fatigue starting at an identification
number which had been stamped into the surface of the blade. Engine cyclinders have failed in
fatigue as a result of quench cracks which formed during the heat-treating operation. Improper
machining of a bolt from a ring cowling of an airplane resulted in failure. An engine-mount
bolt failed because there was no fillet at the head and tool marks were left on the piece. A poor
fillet caused axle failure in service during the landing of an airplane. Fatigue failures which
occured during the testing of an experimental airoplane engine started at unchamfered oil
holes. The fatigue failure of an aircraft engine crankshaft started from a keyway. A crack was
discovered in a landing-gear axle weld after 496 landings. This part had been magnafluxed
earlier in its life, without the crack appearing.
All engineering structures must be properly fabricated initially and carefully handled during
operation and maintenance to prevent damage. Automobile leaf springs have failed prematu-
rely because the men unloading a shipment of springs have carelessly thrown them off a truck,
denting the edges. Pipe lines operating under pressure have failed because of surface imper-
fections. Bridges have succumbed to fatigue failure and fallen into the river. Orthopedic bra-
ces supporting the paralyzed legs of a crippled child have, after only a few weeks of use, failed
through the marks inadvertantly made on the surface by the sharp jaws of a vise while being ass-
embled by the brace maker.
Although it is important that fundamental research on materials and structures be conti-
nued to extend the frontiers of knowledge , it is equally important that we, as engineers , designers
and users of engineering materials, interpret and apply the knowledge that has already become
a part of the public record.
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